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Abstract 
This paper explores the perceptions of Ogoni people about their system of inherited leadership in Ogoniland, It 
focuses on whether the Ogoni people believe that their traditional system of inherited leadership has ameliorated 
or exacerbated the adverse impact of oil capitalism and political interference on their communities. Fieldwork 
was carried out in eight communities in Ogoniland in early 2014 when 69 key informant interviews were 
conducted as well as three focus group discussions. The conclusion reached by the paper is that many Ogoni 
people believe that the system of inherited leadership has let them down in the face of external threats, and that it 
is time to reform that system by incorporating into it some contemporary western principles of good governance.  
Keywords: tradition, inheritance, governance, natural and artificial trust 
1. Introduction to Study Area 
Ogoniland is a kingdom located in Rivers state, one of Nigeria’s Niger Delta (ND) states. By traditional custom, 
Ogoni has six subkingdoms of Babbe, Eleme, Gokana, Ken-Khana, Nyo-Khana, and Tai, which are controlled by 
the area’s paramount ruler (UNEP, 2011). But for easy administration by the state, it is divided into four local 
government areas of Eleme, Gokana, Khana and Tai, and together these areas cover about 1,000km2, housing a 
population of about 832,000 people. According to Boele et al. (2001), who cited Kpone-Tonwe, the Ogoni 
people settled on their lands over 2,000 years ago and have since depended on these lands for survival in 
providing a source of income, food security and employment. Land here includes rivers, streams, rivulets and 
forests from where foods like crayfish, periwinkle and fish were sourced. 
Under the agrarian era, Ogoni family heads mediated over disputes and community leaders (chiefs, council of 
elders) were selected based on chronological age (sometimes adjusted for ability), and since this period 
(pre-colonial) times, chieftaincy stools have remained hereditary. For example, Dumka in 2008  reported that 
the Gbenemene Nama stool has been hereditary since the sixteenth century, remaining under the royal family in 
Sii, which is an Ogoni community within Khana local government area [https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/ 
friends/2008-October/004137.html]. According to many commentators, this pre-colonial era in Ogoniland was 
one of stability, self-sufficiency and harmony marked by good local traditional governance. Igbara and Keenam 
(2013) claimed that before western influence, land cultivation was the main mode of production and was 
available to almost every member of their community with a lineage, and food crises were uncommon, as there 
was sufficient land for agricultural production. 
However, colonialism undermined this system by monetizing land, and it “became a commodity for outright sale. 
The collective ownership of land was removed from the village and taken over by the government leaving 
them…with customary right of ownership” (Igbara and Keenam, (2013, p. 54). This paved the way for oil 
production, since the government was now able to sell/rent land to international oil companies for exploration 
activities. Oil was discovered in Ogoni by Shell in the 1950s, and following expansion in production, Shell 
extended its facilities across ND communities, so by 1993, Ogoni had 12 oil fields, 116 wells of which 89 were 
completed, and 5 flow stations (UNEP, 2011). These wells, according to Pyagbara (2007, p. 5), are linked to 
Bomu, Bodo west, Ebubu, Korokoro and Yorla flow stations by interconnecting pipelines that run through 
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settlements, releasing pollutants mainly through oil spills and gas flares which are toxic to humans and their 
environment: “gas had been flared for 24 hours a day for 40 years in close proximity to human habitation in 
nineteen oil locations in a 404 square mile area with a population density of 1,250 per square mile”.  
Shell’s oil development dislocated the link this sect of people had established with their natural environment for 
over 2,000 years, and the degradation of their land affected their local economy. As Pyagbara pointed out, their 
once viable farming and fishing kingdom gradually lost its fertile lands and clean waters through pollution, 
exposing Ogonis to severe hardship as a result of unemployment and poverty (Maduagwu, 2012). The Nigerian 
state, which granted licences to oil companies like Shell, has not adequately compensated these people, but 
instead has used resources from this area to develop other parts of the country. Boele et al (2001) cited 
Detheridge who reported that from the start of production to 1993, the year Shell moved out of Ogoni, about 634 
million barrels of oil worth US$5.2 billion were produced from this area, of which 79% was remitted to the 
Nigerian government. Ogoni communities became known for their underdevelopment and rural decay: 
paradoxically “it is an environment of great wealth as well as inhuman poverty” (Inokoba and Imbua (2010, p. 
101). Maduagwu (2012) finds a link between the scarcity of fertile lands, poverty, unemployment and the 
increasing number of violent attacks and conflicts that have occurred in recent times in most Ogoni communities.  
In addition to the damage caused by oil capitalism, Ogoni communities have been exploited by politicians who 
have solicited them with promises of development in return for electoral support. According to Chigudu (2015, p. 
121), “political parties realize the ability by political leaders to communicate information and command respect 
from their communities and have developed an edge to rally these leaders to their cause during electioneering” 
(see also Nweke, 2012, and Chinsinga, 2006). 
The questions that this paper addresses are:  do  members of oil-rich Ogoni communities perceive that their 
traditional inherited systems of leadership have resisted oil companies in an attempt to defend communities 
against environmental pollution? And do  members of oil-poor Ogoni communities perceive that their 
traditional inherited systems of leadership have resisted bribes from politicians  to vote for them? Or did the 
members of both sets of communities perceive that their traditional chiefs conspired with the oil companies and 
the politicians, respectively, in order to reinforce their own privileged positions of elite rule, thereby intensifying 
the damage to their communities?  
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections: (2) methodology; (3) theory of inherited traditional leadership; 
(4) fieldwork results and discussion; and (5) conclusion.  
2. Methodology 
The fieldwork for this study took place between February and May, 2014, the aims of which were: to understand 
Ogoni traditional inherited leadership structures; to determine their roles in communities; and to obtain the 
perceptions of respondents about their effectiveness in dealing with the external pressures of oil exploration and 
political interference. To achieve these aims, a total of 8 communities across the four local government areas 
(LGAs) of Ogoniland were studied. Five of these communities (Communities 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) were/are oil-rich 
and they have Shell facilities or spill locations. For example, Community 1 is known for one of the most 
notorious spills in the 1970s; Community 2 houses oil manifolds which cover an area of about 5,000 square 
metres; and Community 3 also has numerous oil wells (UNEP, 2011). The other three communities 
(Communities 6, 7, and 8) were/are oil-poor. While the leaders of oil-rich communities claim that they get only 
limited support from oil companies, in truth these companies have sent enormous amounts of cash into 
contaminated communities to  leadership figures in these communities, whereas oil-poor communities have not 
received such cash (Zandvliet and Pedro, 2002), even though they suffer indirectly from the damage caused by 
oil pollution in neighbouring communities. Oil-poor communities also suffer disproportionately from 
government interventions by politicians seeking electoral loyalty. The choice of oil-rich and oil-poor 
communities as case studies was designed to ascertain whether the traditional system of inherited leadership 
worked well in oil-poor areas, but not in oil-rich areas which were unable to resist the seduction of oil capitalism; 
or whether it worked badly in oil-poor areas because of their susceptibility to political interference.  
This research used a wide range of informants not only as a way of achieving a variety of perceptions from 
stakeholders with diverse backgrounds but also as a way of triangulating different data sources. Key informants 
(KIs) in this research came from church leaders, members and leaders of community organizations, local 
government staff, ward councillors, local chiefs, members of councils of chiefs and elders, members of 
community based organizations (active and passive), university teachers, Shell social performance officers, and 
non-indigenes residents in communities. In total, 69 KI interviews were conducted as well as three focus group 
discussions.  
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3. Theory of Inherited Traditional Leadership 
The traditional school of African thought believes in the value of inherited leadership as a guide to good conduct 
as well as a defense against the incursion of damaging western liberal values into African communities (Logan, 
2008). Proponents of traditional leadership claim that it is not a rigid system of governance but one that over 
time has shown some level of flexibility and ability to adapt to changes in communities. In particular, proponents 
assert that traditional inherited leadership recognizes the dynamism of cultural values and so keeps adjusting to 
meet the increasing demand for wider participation and respect for human rights (Chinsinga, 2006). This is so 
because chiefs are aware of their duties, since, according to Gyeke (1996), as cited by Kendie and Guri (nd), 
their powers are derived from the people and for this reason, there is always a close relationship between the 
chief and his subjects. Indeed, Chinsinga (2006) states that local people have the power to remove chiefs who 
fall short of their expectations. If it were an oppressive and discriminatory system, traditionalists argue, it would 
have ceased existing (Chigudu, 2015). Its very resilience during a period of upheaval brought about by colonial 
and post-colonial oppression, says its defenders, testifies to its enduring value (Chinsinga, 2006).  
Moreover, this institution is an African heritage which has considerable indigenous support, according to its 
defenders. Traditional leaders are and remain custodians of culture as well as controllers of an effective network 
of communication, following their ranked structure (chief, council of chief and elders) in communities. This 
advantage makes replacing this structure with a western model very difficult. Lule (1995, p.11) argued that what 
matters most is how comfortable Africans are with this tradition, rather than whether it meets western criteria of 
democracy. In striking terms, Lule (1995, p. 13) asserted that:  
“it is surprising that there should be people who would wish to abolish an institution which research has 
confirmed to be the anchor of stability, social cohesion, development, progress and conservation of 
culture, while actively championing the preservation of institutions which have over the years brought 
chaos, suffering, national disintegration and loss of millions” 
Chinsinga’s findings in Malawi suggest that local people preferred their traditional institutions because they 
considered them as agents of positive change when compared with elected councillors, for four reasons: their 
local chiefs are the owners of the villages; they live in the villages and thus fully understand their problems; they 
resolve conflicts, prevent crime, and ensure that morals are maintained in their communities; and they guarantee 
that community development projects work.  
However, a contrary view of traditional inherited leadership has been expressed by adherents of the modernist 
school, arguing that this system has no democratic base; hinders social mobility by perpetuating a caste system 
(Chingudu,2015); endorses widespread discrimination against women (Okome, 2002); and impedes the 
development of self-rule (Logan, 2008). According to Olowu and Erero (1995, p. 14), the culture of inherited 
leadership has internal weaknesses: “they are restrictive…as political office is often held for life. They are not 
entirely transparent…they lack effective managerial skills.” Chigudu (2015, p. 121) states that “traditional 
leadership has no place in electoral democracy as it contradicts the very basic values of freedom of choice”. 
Moreover, such critics argue that these flaws in traditional inherited leadership have exacerbated the damage 
caused by external threats such as colonialism, post-colonialism and oil exploration. For example, Luthe (2007) 
reported Mamdani’s assertion that during colonial times, traditional chiefs were tools of the colonial powers, 
given enhanced power by their political masters. Chigudu (2015, p. 120) explained that “in post-colonial era, 
there have been reports of electoral manipulation through the institution of traditional leadership”. Pyagbara 
(2007) claimed that in his Ogoni kingdom, as a result of oil capitalism, these traditional institutions have become 
agents of disintegration (see also Arisukwu and Nnaomah, 2012). Traditional chiefs facilitated access of oil 
developers to the land in their communities, thereby conspiring in the resultant environmental damage (Agbonifo 
and Aghedo, 2015).  
It is in the light of this controversy that our research investigated perceptions of traditional leadership in five 
oil-rich and three oil-poor communities, to ascertain to what extent respondents believed that the damage 
inflicted by oil exploration and political interference respectively was mitigated by public-spirited traditional 
inherited leadership, or was worsened by traditional chiefs conniving with oil companies and politicians for 
personal gain at the expense of their communities’ well-being. 
4. Fieldwork Results and Discussion 
The study’s  fieldwork revealed a similar division of opinion to that expressed in the literature on the value of 
traditional leadership, between those respondents who strongly defended it and those respondents who strongly 
criticised it. The defenders included most community leaders in Ogoniland, who argued that the culture of 
inherited leadership was one legacy from their ancestors that they should preserve. For example,  respondent 
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KI-18 asserted that “we cannot afford to abandon this culture (inherited leadership)”. According to respondent 
KI-23, “when you meet the leadership of these communities, they provide you with necessary information that 
you need”. Respondent KI-6, an octogenarian leader, claimed that since ascending the throne he has followed the 
good precedents of his predecessor, his late father. Defenders of traditional leadership claimed it had some 
built-in safeguards. For instance, respondent KI-17 argued that  
“here  [Ogoniland]  it is hereditary, if your old grandfather was a chief, the throne will never leave your 
family…even when you are from a royal family, the community will still decide whether you are capable or 
not, they will pick a capable person [from] outside until they get a capable person from the family”.  
However, the critics of traditional leadership were far more numerous and vociferous. According to most KIs in 
the five oil-rich communities, the response of traditional leaders to the presence of oil and Shell facilities was 
damaging to local communities. For example, KI-26, reported that “local chiefs are the people oil companies use 
to penetrate our community…they are always in favour of oil companies because of what they get from them”. 
Respondent KI-17, a member of the council of chiefs and an elder of an oil-rich community, asserted that 
traditional leaders respond to oil companies’ funds in their areas in either of two ways; by side-lining their  
council members, or by ensuring that they connive with them to rob their community. In his own community, 
respondent KI-17 reported that the former alternative was chosen, and the side-lined council members  are 
unhappy with their chief because  
“Shell gave us the opportunity to provide 6 people that will join their clean-up team, our paramount 
ruler sat down himself and picked 6 people, he picked contractors from wherever he liked, without 
meeting with CDC chairman or council of chiefs, without a common meeting, he submitted the list to 
Shell without our notice”.  
Respondent KI-21 also claimed  with regard to his oil-poor community that the latter alternative operated: 
chiefs conniving with their council members to select officials who will be loyal to him, so these officials “don’t 
confront their traditional leaders, because they are the same people that these chiefs use”. Both types of abuse 
of traditional governance strategy, according to Nweke (2012), have caused many violent conflicts within 
communities. Youths no longer trust the leadership of their communities, especially community chiefs who 
receive cash on their behalf from oil companies, and they constantly challenge these leaders, demanding their 
own share of the oil companies’ cash. Likewise, Arisuokwu and Nnaomah (2012, p. 139) claim that traditional 
chieftaincy stools are losing value and respect to the point that most youths in oil-rich communities no longer 
subject themselves to the leadership of their communities: “they have become more violent in their approach and 
this has led to more bloodshed and destructions”.  
The underlying aim of most of these violent conflicts is to obtain access to the oil money and the ‘political’ 
money from politicians seeking electoral positions, both of which are given to chieftaincy stools on behalf of 
their communities (Nweke, 2012;  Zandvliet and Pedro, 2002). The competition for these gifts accounts for 
some of the worst conflicts that have occurred in this area in recent times. For example, Kialee (2011) reported 
that Zaakpon community suffered a crisis for five years over challenges to its chieftaincy stool, noting that 
during this period, in 2005, the entire community was deserted, leaving only cult groups. According to him, these 
cult members are illiterate young people between the ages of 12-25, who are now hired by local chiefs to wage 
war on their behalf when there are threats to their thrones.  
 
Table1. Timeline of violent attacks and their causes 2003-2007 (Kialee, 2011) 
Inter/intra community conflicts Cause of conflict Date Duration 
Kaani 1 versus Kaani2 Chieftaincy and councillorship seats 2003-2007 5 years 
Zaakpon Claims over chieftaincy stool 2003-2007 5 years 
Kapnoo Clashes between community cult groups March 2006-Dec-2007 21 months
Bodo community Clashes between community cult groups July 19-30 2006 14 days 
Kpong  Claims over chieftaincy stool April-Sept 2007  6 months
Kono Boue versus Uwegwere community Clash between cult members May-Aug 2007 4 months 
Kor community Claims over chieftaincy stool June-Aug 2007 3 months 
 
Ikerionwu (2013) stated  that circumstances in both oil-rich and oil-poor communities are not improving for 
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Ogonis, as unemployment, poverty and community decay are increasing and there is growing psycho-social 
degradation. Respondent KI-16 attributed these problems to the poor quality of leadership delivered through the 
culture of inheritance: “70% of our problems here are caused by our chiefs…they just got up and ascended their 
thrones because their fathers were chiefs”. Respondent KI-21 emphasized personal motives of self-enrichment 
as one reason why traditional institutions of community leadership headed by a chief have failed to work in his 
oil-poor community because through inheritance, people who ascend chieftaincy stools seek money:  
“when they ascend the throne, they wait for the first contract that will come into their community, they 
use that money as a source to set up themselves, that is why people in this community are not benefitting 
from the government”.  
In oil-rich communities, any oil funds sent into the community pass through the hands of these chiefs (Zandvliet 
and Pedro, 2002). Even advocates of inherited leadership like Kendie and Guri (nd-b, p. 345) admitted that the 
‘asafo’, which is a traditional authority in Ghana, “started conniving with the illegal forest operators for their 
personal benefit”. The suspicion arises, therefore, that traditional inherited leadership has inherent flaws in 
dealing with any form of resources because its lack of transparency and accountability makes it readily 
susceptible to corruption.  
At the root of some of these deficiencies identified by respondents is poor education. Kendie and Guri (nd-a) 
pointed to the limited educational backgrounds of local leaders as an important issue that affected the quality of 
local leadership, arguing that while the attainment of education is not a sufficient criterion for good leadership, it 
may be a necessary one. Respondent K-63 traced the many problems in his oil-rich community to the poor 
educational status of its local leaders. For instance, he thought its leaders fell prey to Shell because “our chiefs 
did not go to school, they were traditionalists that whenever anybody spoke English to them, they will consider 
that person reliable, they don’t know that they were being deceived”. This to him explains why politicians are 
able to manipulate chiefs so easily. Respondents KI-16 and KI-65 thought the chiefs in both oil-rich and oil-poor 
communities are passive and wait for development, because their poor educational attainments make it hard for 
them to actively attract development. For Chinsinga (2006, p. 1), chiefs who get involved in partisan politics are 
vulnerable because “their ill material circumstances render them overwhelmingly easy targets for politicians bent 
on satisfying their own strategic political considerations”. KI-28 questioned how these communities will develop 
when their community leaders “do not bother to attract development…companies here are looking for indigenes 
to employ but their community leaders go there take the spaces, sign and sell them out to non-indigenes, how do 
you expect this place to grow?”  
For another reason, respondent KI-21 held that the poor educational status of chiefs could destabilize 
communities: educated members of his oil-poor community find it extremely difficult to subject themselves to 
the leadership of a non-educated chief and claimed that this was the major cause of the seven years’ crisis that 
befell his community:  
“our lower chief use to say that the higher chief is not presentable because of his level of education… 
they don’t always agree to whatever our highness says…they see their senior as inferior and not 
intelligent and because of this on several occasions the high chief has danced to their tune but the 
councillorship elections led to their major disagreement and this caused us over seven years of 
instability”.  
Respondent KI-2, a chief of an oil-poor community, explained that community chiefs get involved in politics out 
of external pressure to deliver their communities electorally to politicians. Respondent KI-12, leader of 
community women, openly admitted that the linkage between her leadership in her community and the ruling 
party in her state is purely for personal gains:  
“am now the new women leader of All Progressive Congress (APC) party in my community, I decamped 
from Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), am a politician…they have asked me to ensure that all…women 
vote for APC at all levels. When I was in PDP I gave each of them (women) wrappers and cash. We 
(community leadership), will work together to deliver to APC, our gain will be 50-50 (equally)”.  
KI-28 reported that community chiefs and council members take advantage of their poor subjects: “one 
politician can buy off the whole community through their leaders”. This, according to KI-19, explains why 
“Ogoni has been vulnerable to violence…they got themselves divided along different political lines“. KI-67 
stated that leadership of communities (oil-rich and oil poor) headed by chiefs utilize “any slightest opportunity 
that they have to take money” from politicians, ignoring the destructive consequences of party politics on their 
communities. Agbonifo and Aghedo (2015, p. 154) claim that Ogonis in both oil-rich and oil-poor communities 
feel “betrayed and disinherited by their supposed leaders”, and noted that it is for this reason that youths named 
www.ccsenet.org/jsd Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 9, No. 1; 2016 
60 
 
their chiefs ‘vultures’. KI-29 argued that as a result, “Ogoni is lawless, nobody respects anybody, any young boy 
can do whatever he likes because no authority can call him to order, ordinarily they are supposed to report him 
to the leadership of the community, but is not possible they are themselves, lawless”. 
These forms of corruption have exacerbated the threats to both oil-rich and oil-poor communities’ development 
in Ogoniland for 20 years (Kialee, 2011). Yet, according to respondent KI-64, Ogoni culture permits chiefs to 
remain on their thrones and “not much can be done to them because of the fear that if he is changed something 
bad will happen in the community, fear will not even allow people to question them”. KI-16 narrated his 
experience with the Nigerian police over a case of corruption against his community chief: 
“I wrote a petition against our chief, the commissioner of police invited him and after interrogation, the 
police asked us to settle it because of tradition. In our kind of society if anybody hears that I arrested 
the chief, they will blame me not minding our chief’s offence, I will be seen as the greatest offender. 
After considering all these I thought it was wiser not to pursue the case any further”. 
It is also because of this tradition that ailing chiefs are not readily replaced. Respondent KI-68 reported that his 
oil-rich community remained dormant for about five years because their chief suffered from a stroke. Indeed, 
there is no form of accountability or avenue for recourse against misuse of or incapacity for  power (Chigudu, 
2015). Respondent KI-65 from an oil-poor community reported that his community chiefs “just give out titles 
and the title holders don’t research deeply to know what they are supposed to be doing and what they are not 
supposed to do”.  
These criticisms of traditional leadership may be summed up by the statement from KI-67 that “style of 
leadership and administration matters so much. If a chief cannot organize his people, if he lives a life that is 
questionable or suspicious there must always be problems in his community” (KI-67).  
Several respondents argued for reforms. For example, respondent K-53 from an oil-rich community thought his 
community can only achieve peace and development when they “remove all our leaders because they are not 
helping us, there are good people that can represent us very well”. Respondents, KI-54, 50 and 57 argued for the 
state and other external interventionists to bypass their local chiefs and deal directly with individuals in the 
community. For example, respondent KI-54 claimed that “if government can help us directly without going 
through our leaders, our lives will change”. Some communities (both oil-rich and oil-poor) have made 
significant efforts to reform their systems of traditional inherited leadership to guard against corruption. For 
example, Ogoni communities have introduced three innovations in governance: (1) rotating; (2) parallel; and (3) 
complementary.  
The ‘rotating’ system is the first attempt made in some oil-rich communities to replace incumbent chiefs. It 
involves elections conducted usually by the council of elders, who with external support depose incumbent 
chiefs. Elections here are not open to the public - only selected community members may participate. According 
to KI-68, who is both a member of the council of chiefs and an elder in his community, the aim of this 
innovation is to ensure that more capable hands ascend their throne and also that community wealth does not end 
up in the bank accounts of the royal family, but is equally enjoyed by other council members. Wealth here 
includes royalties paid by companies, job allocations, and community scholarships. However, KI-14, a former 
community chief and victim deposed through this system, criticized it, claiming that “Shell colluded with some 
of our people, on their own they elected in another chief. My people ganged up with Shell against me, before I 
knew what was happening there was an order on my throne”. 
The ‘parallel’ system entails the existence of a permanent opposition to the incumbent local chief. This 
opposition usually comes from more educated members of the community. KI-63 thought it was time more 
learned people took over the leadership of his oil-rich community: “we ( [learned members of our community]  
are ashamed of ourselves because of the events that happened in our community…some time ago, buildings were 
razed, even just within four months, we had four paramount rulers, our people fought against each other, we 
passed through hell”. He said that it was for these reasons that educated members of his community formed an 
‘elites club’ which conducted elections for chieftaincy stools in his community, though after the stool was 
occupied by an educated person, their dethroned chief fought back. While this ‘radical’ form of opposition was 
observed mainly  in oil-rich communities, the most common form of parallel structure is the ‘moderate’ or 
pluralist form, wherein council members (youth, women, chairmen of the council of chiefs and elders as well as 
chairmen of community development committees), oppose each other. This moderate form is common in all 
eight communities studied. 
The ‘complementary’ system is a more consensual and harmonious relationship between formal and informal 
governing bodies. For instance, it occurs where community elites (learned) people work together with their local 
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chiefs. This innovation was observed in Community 4, where members of the community social club work 
closely with their local chief. According to KI-2, KI-8, KI-25 and KI-64, members of this club recognized the 
shortcomings of their local chiefs and institutions and so got involved to remedy them in a cooperative way.  
Critics may argue that these three innovations are only modest improvements on the traditional inherited system 
of leadership, since none of them is democratic. The rotating system is usually built from the relics of the former 
incumbent structure and so the only difference may be the change in the lineage of the elite; both the  radical  
and moderate forms of the parallel structure restricted the franchise to the elite; and the complementary system is 
consensualism between elites.  
5. Conclusion 
From our research, it is clear that while Ogoni respondents hold that oil capitalism and political bribery have 
been largely responsible for a sharp deterioration in their community well-being, they see shortcomings of the 
traditional inherited leadership system in Ogoniland as a major contributory cause. These shortcomings include 
criticisms of traditional leaders for failure to embrace an accountable leadership style; to provide a peaceful 
environment for their subjects; and to seek development rather than wait for it. Moreover, respondents regret that 
the traditional structure has not provided any opportunity for the led to choose their leaders or express their 
concerns; hence the upsurge in conflicts over contested structures of governance in many communities. 
According to respondents, maintaining this traditional form of inherited leadership is akin to maintaining a caste 
system, which instead of promoting communality, diminishes it.  
Our conclusion, therefore, is that Ogonis believe there are inherent flaws in the traditional inherited leadership 
system in Ogoniland that has made it easily susceptible to seduction by oil capitalism and political interference, 
thereby exacerbating rather than ameliorating the environmental damage done to their communities by oil 
production. Efforts have been made to reform the traditional system to make it more resistant to corruption, but 
these efforts have so far been timid. In our view, what is needed is more vigorous reform to make traditional 
leaders more responsible to their people. Because the reliance on ‘natural trust’ in traditional leaders has failed to 
provide good governance, we should try ‘artificial trust’ by applying contemporary western principles of good 
governance such as accountability, transparency, and fairness. One way to implement these principles is by 
giving community members the opportunity to elect people who can work with local chiefs, thereby integrating 
traditional and modernist systems of governance. While critics of electoral processes may argue that elections are 
far from perfect, this paper sees more serious problems in retaining a virtual caste system where citizens are 
treated as objects rather than as subjects.  
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